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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3777 
___________ 
 
TROY LAMONT ROGERS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DETECTIVE MILLS, (RET) BRISTOL TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPT.; 
BRISTOL TOWNSIHP POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
UNKNOWN OFFICERS & DEA AGENTS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-04706) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 21, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Troy Lamont Rogers appeals the District Court’s order dismissing 
his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291.  Our review is plenary. See Digacomo v. 
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Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Phila. and Vicinity, 420 F.3d 220, 222 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2005) (stating standard of review over dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6 )).  Because the 
appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Rogers is currently a federal inmate at the Bennettsville South Caroline Prison 
Camp.  He is serving a 276-month sentence for his 1996 conviction of distribution of 
17.92 grams of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground.  He filed this action 
against Detective Mills, the Bristol Township Police Department, and “unknown officers 
and DEA Agents” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Detective Mills acted 
improperly during the 1994 investigation that led to his conviction and imprisonment.  
Specifically, Rogers alleged that Detective Mills induced a confidential informant to add 
a half ounce of cocaine base to the amount of cocaine base the informant purchased from 
Rogers.  The defendants filed two separate motions to dismiss the complaint.  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motions in their entirety, finding that the 
“favorable termination rule” established in Heck v. Humphery, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 
barred Rogers’ claims under § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
1
 
                                              
1The District Court properly construed Rogers’ constitutional claims against the federal 
officers as brought under Bivens.  See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (stating that a Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a § 1983 cause of 
action against state actors.). 
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 We agree with the District Court’s determination that Rogers’ complaint fails to 
state a cause of action.  In 1994, the Supreme Court held that if the success of a § 1983 
damages claim brought by a prisoner “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence,” the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or 
sentence has been invalidated.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).  This bar 
not only applies to requests for money damages, but also to requests for equitable and 
declaratory relief.  See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).  The Heck rule 
applies to bar such claims under Bivens as well.  See Lora-Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 
506 n.2 (3rd Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam)).  Here, Rogers alleges that Mills induced the confidential informant to add a half 
ounce of cocaine base to the amount of cocaine base he bought from Rogers.  Because 
the amount of cocaine base sold by Rogers directly impacts Rogers’ conviction and the 
calculation of his sentence, the success of Rogers’ § 1983 claim would necessarily imply 
their invalidity.  Moreover, Rogers has not alleged that his conviction or sentence has 
been overturned, or that he has successfully challenged the validity of his confinement or 
duration.
2
  As a result, his claims are barred by Heck and were properly dismissed.    
                                              
2
 The District Court correctly notes that Rogers has unsuccessfully challenged his 
sentence through several avenues, including a direct appeal and relief under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255. 
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 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Roger’s complaint because the appeal presents no substantial question.3  
 
 
                                              
3
 The District Court did not provide Rogers leave to amend his complaint before 
dismissing it with prejudice.  We conclude that the District Court did not err in declining 
to allow Rogers an opportunity to amend because we do not see how any amendment to 
his complaint would save his claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that a court should not dismiss pro se complaints without 
granting leave to amend unless “amendment would be inequitable or futile”). 
